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SUMMARY
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of resource-starving miniature sensor nodes deployed in a
remote and hostile environment. These networks operate on small batteries for days, months and even years
depending on the requirements of monitored applications. The battery-powered operation and inaccessible
human-terrains make it practically infeasible to recharge the nodes unless some energy scavenging
techniques are employed. These networks experience threats at various layers and as such, are vulnerable to
a wide range of attacks. The resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes, in-accessible human terrains and
error-prone communication links make it obligatory to design lightweight but robust and secured schemes
for these networks. In view of these limitations, we aim to design an extremely lightweight payload-based
mutual authentication scheme for a cluster-based hierarchical WSN. The proposed scheme, also known
as PAWN, operates in two steps. First, an optimal percentage of cluster heads is elected, authenticated
and allowed to communicate with neighbouring nodes. Second, each cluster head, in a role of server,
authenticates the nearby nodes for cluster formation. We validate our proposed scheme using various
simulation metrics which outperforms the existing schemes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of miniature sensor nodes deployed to monitor,
sense, capture and process the data about an application, i.e., phenomena of interest [1]. These nodes
are resource-starving and as such are highly constrained on battery power, storage, computation,
data rate and available bandwidth. Typically, they are deployed and left unattended in a remote
and human-inaccessible terrain to perform monitoring and reporting tasks. As a result, the limited
resources of these nodes need to be utilized efficiently to prolong the network lifetime. Due to
their unique characteristics of self-healing and fault-tolarance, these networks have found their
applications in various domains such as military surveillance, health care, industrial automation,
home automation, agriculture, and environmental monitoring [2].
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Applications deployed in hostile environment with little human interventions to manage them
expose these networks to various threats and vulnerabilities. These networks are susceptible to
not only physical tampering but also various remote attacks such as sink hole, worm hole, Sybil,
replications, homing and distributed denial-of-service flooding [3][4]. As a result, the nodes in
general and the network in particular need to be protected against these threats. Lightweight but
highly efficient and robust authentication schemes need to be designed for these networks. The
resource-constrained nature of the nodes limits the support and application of resource-intensive,
highly robust and sophisticated authentication and privacy schemes to these networks. The existing
security schemes require ample of resources in terms of computation, transmission, storage and
available bandwidth. Their application to WSNs deteriorates the network performance and rapidly
depletes the network lifetime. As a result, designing lightweight but highly intelligent and robust
security solutions is a challenging task in these networks. The provisioning of security, privacy and
trust need to be kept in mind while the prototype of a routing protocol is designed. Furthermore, the
underlying operations of different routing protocols also influence the energy consumption which
is linked directly with the application of any secured scheme. Among all the routing protocols,
cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols efficiently utilize the limited resources of sensor nodes.
These protocols are highly efficient in terms of data aggregation, energy consumption, collision
avoidance, load balancing, fault-tolerance and network lifetime [5]. Unlike other protocols, a single
cluster head collects data from multiple nodes in order to eliminate redundancy and improves the
quality of aggregated data. These protocols use intra-cluster and inter-cluster communication to
reduce long-haul transmissions to a base station.
Cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols perform only intelligent partitioning of the network
to provide energy-efficient communication. The underlying network still suffers from various threats
posed during set-up and steady-state phases. During set-up phase, an adversary may declare itself
as a cluster head by broadcasting advertisement messages with much stronger signal strengths.
It is also possible that an adversary may participate in cluster formation or prevent legitimate
nodes from joining a cluster head. An attacker may eavesdrop on advertisement packets and/or
join-request packets and replay in other parts of the network. Furthermore, the same attacker has
the ability to maliciously manipulate the contents of these packets. An adversary may disrupt the
ongoing operations in one or more clusters by constantly emitting jamming signals or launching
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [6]. An adversary may deceive a cluster head by persuading it to
create a false member list for its members and as a result, a wrong Time Division Multiple Access
(TDMA) schedule is created for its members [7]. An adversary may launch a more sophisticated
attack by colluding with other adversaries in their neighbourhood [8]. In [9], the authors analyzed
the behaviour of various attacks such as, continuous election as cluster head, TDMA schedule
obedience, aborting and/or no transmission of member/cluster head data and transmission of
powerful signals. In [10], the authors investigated the behaviour of Sybil nodes in cluster-based
hierarchical routing protocols. They studied the impact and consequences of Sybil nodes performing
the role of cluster heads in these networks. A single Sybil node has the ability to breakdown the
whole communication in a cluster-based WSN provided that it is elected as a cluster head.
In this paper, we present a payload-based mutual authentication algorithm, also known as PAWN,
which uses a centralized cluster-based hierarchical WSN. The major contributions of our research
are as follows.
1. The existing centralized cluster-based hierarchical protocols do not guarantee an optimal
percentage of cluster heads. However, our proposed algorithm always elects an optimal
percentage of such nodes so that it enhances the lifetime of the network and reduces the
number of server nodes required for communication.
2. PAWN only initiate data communication when the base station, cluster heads and
neighbouring nodes are authenticated. It uses extremely lightweight nomination packets and
advertisement messages to perform base station/cluster head and cluster head/neighbouring
nodes authentication.
3. A lightweight version of AES algorithm is used and the payload of each authentication
message does not exceed 256 bits.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the related works from
literature. In Section III, we present our PAWN algorithm in terms of cluster head selection and
cluster formation. In Section IV, experimental results of our proposed scheme are presented. Finally,
the paper is concluded and future research directions are provided in Section V.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide an overview of cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols as they
are used as the underlying platform by our proposed scheme. Next, various lightweight mutual
authentication and key agreement schemes are discussed in the context of WSNs.
Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [11] was designated as a pioneer protocol
among clustering-based hierarchical routing protocols. LEACH partitions a sensor field into small
geographical regions known as clusters. Each cluster has a cluster head node which collects and
aggregates data from member nodes and transmits them to a base station. The protocol operates in
rounds and nodes take turn to become cluster heads in subsequent rounds for uniform distribution of
energy load. The problem with LEACH protocol is the probabilistic selection of cluster heads using
random number generation. Each node, i, chooses a random number between 0 and 1. If the chosen
number is less than the threshold value T(i), the node is elected as a cluster head for the current








, if i ∈ G,
0, otherwise.
(1)
Here, kopt is the optimal percentage of cluster heads in each round, r is the current round and
G is the set of nodes that have not been elected as cluster heads in the past 1
kopt
rounds. The
probabilistic selection of cluster heads has a potential risk of low energy nodes being elected as
cluster heads in subsequent rounds. Moreover, Equation 1 cannot guarantee an optimal number of
cluster heads in each round. In [12], the authors argued that cluster heads need to be elected based
on the residual energy of the nodes. They suggested the inclusion of residual energy of nodes in
Equation 1. However, it does not solve the problem because cluster heads are still elected using a
random number generation. To solve this problem, nodes need to be elected by a central controller,
i.e., a base station. In [13], the authors proposed a centralized approach for cluster head selection.
Nodes having remaining energy greater than the average residual energy are elected as cluster heads
in each round. However, it is highly probable that there are a large number of such nodes in each
round resulting in too many cluster heads. In [14], we proposed a centralized scheme which elected
an optimal percentage of cluster heads (5% of total nodes). Each round results in balanced clusters
that enhance network stability, scalability and data aggregation. Moreover, the proposed approach
reduces network load, energy consumption and congestion. Irrespective of a centralized or randomly
distributed cluster-based approach, each round consists of a set-up phase and a steady-state phase.
During the set-up phase, cluster heads are elected, cluster are formed and schedules are created. In
the steady-state phase, each cluster head collects data from its member nodes and transmits them to
a centralized base station.
For secured transmission of data in cluster-based hierarchical networks, there exist various
secured versions of LEACH in literature [15] [16][17][18]. Most of these protocols used a one-way
key chain[19] for encryption and decryption purposes. The chain is generated using a one-way hash
function H on the last key in each chain. In [20], a survey was conducted to analyze and evaluate
the performances of various secured cluster-based hierarchical schemes. Most of these schemes
increase the security of set-up and steady-state phases in particular and the overall operation of
the network in general. In these schemes, LEACH-alike cluster hierarchies are protected against
various attacks launched by adversaries from outside the network. These schemes make it hard to
compromise various operations performed within the set-up and steady-state phases by deploying
various key distribution mechanisms. The application of asymmetric encryption to miniature sensor
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nodes exhausts their resources quickly and rapidly reduce the lifetime of WSNs. As a result, most
of the studies focus on symmetric encryption for security and privacy provisioning in cluster-based
WSNs. In [21], SecLEACH protocol was proposed for securing cluster-based hierarchical WSNs.
Prior to network deployment, SecLEACH generates a large pool of keys using a random key pre-
distribution approach. Each node is allocated a small subset of these keys, also known as key
ring, drawn pseudo randomly from the pool. Furthermore, each node is assigned a pairwise key
which is shared with the base station and a group key common to each member of the network.
Upon network deployment, each cluster head advertises itself by broadcasting a message containing
information about the keys in its pre-defined key ring. In SecLEACH, the base station is responsible
for authenticating the advertisement messages as it is a resource-rich entity and is highly trusted.
Upon authentication by the base station, each neighbouring node forms a cluster around its nearest
cluster head with whom they share the group key. Cryptographic-based LEACH variants are robust
only against external attacks, however, they are not capable to tackle threats posed by internal
adversaries, e.g., a compromised sensor. This is due to the fact that compromised sensors have
already been allocated authentication keys and they have the same privileges which are required for
transmission of authenticated information. As a result, conventional authentication algorithms fail
to detect such an attack [22]. A centralized secure LEACH (CSLEACH) was proposed in [23]. Each
neighbouring node and its gateway share a unique private key which is used for authentication of
broadcasted advertisement messages. Each node possesses two keys, i.e., a gateway private key and
a neighbor private key. A node waits for a message upon entering the network at the start of each
round. A particular round is initiated by the gateway using a Round Start Message (RSM). These
messages are mainly used for synchronization purposes. These messages distribute a network key
and a session template for generation of Medium Access Control keys (KMAC) and session keys.
Any communication between a neighbouring node and its gateway is encrypted by the session key.
These keys also encrypt the communication between a cluster head and its member nodes. KMAC,
on the other hand, encodes MAC for providing integrity in the network.
3. PAWN: PAYLOAD-BASED AUTHENTICATION FOR WSN
Our proposed scheme mainly consists of two important steps and are presented as follows.
1. An optimal percentage of cluster heads are elected and advertised to the network using
a token-based authentication approach. The token is used for correlating cluster head
advertisement messages with the corresponding acknowledgment messages.
2. A payload-based mutual authentication is used for cluster formation between neighbouring
nodes and their nearest cluster head.
Both of these steps are part of the set-up phase during which cluster heads are elected and clusters
are formed around them. In this section, first we present the token-based optimal election of cluster
heads followed by a payload-based mutual authentication for a cluster-based hierarchical WSN. An
optimal election of cluster heads enables us to nominate very few nodes as servers. The unelected
nodes become the potential clients of cluster heads in the network.
3.1. Token-based Cluster Head Election
Our proposed network model consists of randomly deployed heterogeneous sensor nodes. There are
100 normal nodes and 5 higher-energy nodes in the network. To reduce the operational cost, normal
nodes are equipped with initial energy of 1 joule each, and higher-energy nodes are equipped with 5
joules each. All nodes are deployed in a 100× 100 sq. meter geographical region. The role of each
node is specified as follows.
1. Only normal nodes can be elected as cluster heads.
2. Only normal nodes are eligible to participate in a client-server interaction model.
3. Higher-energy nodes assist the base station in cluster head election.
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Each neighbour node sends a join-request message to a cluster head having the strongest of
signal strength for cluster formation. However, cluster formation is not a straight forward process.
A neighbour needs to authenticate itself before association with a cluster head. Furthermore, each
neighbour is not sure about the authenticity of a cluster head. As a result, not only the neighbours,
but also the cluster head needs to authenticate themselves. To do so, each neighbour transmits a
join-request message to a prospective cluster head as discussed in the next section.
3.2. Payload-based Mutual Authentication
Upon successful reception of advertisement messages, each neighbouring node initiates cluster
formation. The aim of cluster head selection was to elect a feasible number of servers for
neighbouring nodes. On the other hand, the aim of cluster formation is to allow authentic data
transmission to a base station via the elected servers. The authentication process is accomplished
using a 128-bit AES encryption algorithm. This mode of encryption requires less resources and is
extremely beneficial for time-critical, delay-sensitive data generated by the nodes. Furthermore,
it allows enough time for the nodes to offload their data before an attack is launched. AES-
192 and AES-256, on the other hand, are highly computational, resource-consuming and require
sophisticated hardware and software platforms. Such requirements are not fulfilled by most of the
resource-constrained sensor nodes.
To meet the requirements of resource-starving miniature sensor nodes, we use a lightweight
payload-based mutual authentication technique. In our proposed scheme, authentication is
performed within the payload of each message. Each neighbouring node exchanges multiple
handshake messages with a server as shown in Figure 3. The authentication process is completed
in four extremely light-weighted handshake messages. Once authenticated, each neighbouring
node is allowed to transmit its data to its respective cluster head. The authentication procedure





During session initiation, each neighbour, i, creates a join-request message which contains IDi
and IDCHS . Here, IDi is the identity of the source node and IDCHS is the identity of the destination
node of cluster head, S. Both the source and destination IDs are of 8-bits. This number of bits results
in sufficiently light-weighted join-request messages. Irrespective of a legitimate or a malicious node,
each neighbour can negotiate a maximum of four session initiation requests with a server. After these
attempts, any further requests from the given neighbour are discarded and the server refrains from
any further communication with it. During session initiation phase, IDi is transmitted within the
payload and IDCHS is transmitted within the header of each join-request message. The payload is
followed by an optional Frame Check Sequence (FCS), which is appended as a trailer and is used
for error detection and correction.
In the server challenge phase, each server retrieves IDCHS from the header and IDi from the
payload of a received join-request message. If IDCHS matches the server ID, it means that the join-
request message was indeed intended for it. If a match is not found, the join-request message is
discarded. To negotiate a session, IDi must match with an identity within the pool of identities
provided to a given server. A match can only be found if IDi ∈ IDNB. Each server retrieves IDi from
the payload and searches for a matching λi. Each identity IDi within IDNB is associated with a λi
for authentication purpose. If a match is found, the server responds back with an encrypted payload
using an AES algorithm. At this point, the server creates a challenge for the client i. For successful
authentication, this challenge needs to be deciphered by i.
To create a challenge, the server generates a pseudo-random nonce (ηserver) and a potential
session key (µkey) of 128-bit each. Nonce is a temporary number used only once by a client/server
in the entire cryptographic communication. Using µkey and ηserver, an encrypted payload is
generated. First, an XOR operation is performed on λi and µkey using Equation 4. This operation
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The 128-bit ψresultant is appended with ηclient and encrypted with µkey to generate an encrypted
payload as shown in Equation 7. The 256-bit encrypted payload (γclient-payload) is transmitted to the
server as a challenge.
γclient-payload = {µkey, (ψresultant|ηclient)}AES128. (7)
Finally, in the server response phase, the server deciphers the encrypted payload (γclient-payload)
of the client challenge to observe ηserver in it. If present, the server realizes that the client has
successfully authenticated itself. The server retrieves ηclient and creates an encrypted payload of its
own by appending ηclient to µkey and encrypting with λi as shown in Equation 8. Next, the 256-bit
encrypted payload (γserver-payload) is transmitted in response to the client challenge.
γserver-payload = {λi, (ηclient|µkey)}AES128. (8)
At this point of time, the status of ongoing session changes from session negotiation to
authenticated at the server because client i is successfully authenticated and is eligible to transmit
its data to the server. The client, however, has yet to verify the authenticity of the server. It decrypts
the payload γserver-payload and observe ηclient in it. As the client is the one which generated ηclient,
the client comprehends that the response is from a legitimate server. Both the client and the server
are mutually authenticated and they have agreed upon a common session key (µkey) for exchanging
the data packets. At this stage, both i and the server are mutually authenticated. The server creates a
schedule for each member node iwithin its cluster. The server allocates TDMA slots to each member
node within its cluster. These slots are used for contention-free communication and scheduling the
duty-cycle of each node. The four phases of our payload-based mutual authentication handshaking
are shown in Algorithm 1.
Once the client and server are authenticated, the set-up phase is completed and the steady-
state phase is initiated. During this phase, each cluster head collects data from its member nodes,
aggregates the data and transmits them to a base station located inside or outside the sensor field. In
Figure 4, the complete set of operations performed by PAWN is shown.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results and experimental analysis of PAWN algorithm. For
simulation, we set up our experiments using Matlab R2011a. PAWN network model consists of
100 normal nodes and 5 higher-energy nodes deployed in a 100× 100 square meter area. The base
station is located outside the sensor field and is a resource-rich entity.
4.1. Security Analysis
PAWN provides authenticity, confidentiality and freshness of data for node-to-node communication.
In Table I, we compare PAWN against the existing schemes.
PAWN uses a two-step procedure for provisioning of authentication. First, a predefined procedure
is used to elect the cluster heads. Upon election, a token-based technique is used for secured
transmission of advertisement messages. Second, each cluster head, in a role of server, verifies
the identities of potential clients, i.e., the neighbouring nodes. The payload-based authentication is
used to validate the identities of nodes in the incoming packets. In comparison, LEACH-C does
not provide any authentication as it only partitions the network into clusters. SecLEACH, on the
other hand, uses Message Authentication Code (MAC) for authentication purpose. Each message
is encrypted with a key using a key pool. After successful decryption of the message, the receiver
knows that message is originated from a legitimate node in the sensor field.
PAWN uses a payload-based approach to provide message confidentiality. The payload of join-
request messages and nomination packets are used for this purpose. LEACH-C, on the other
hand, does not provide data confidentiality while SecLEACH uses the same MAC for message
confidentiality. Freshness of messages is guaranteed by nonces in PAWN and SecLEACH. PAWN,
as a mutual authentication scheme, includes both the client and server nonces because both parties
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Algorithm 1 Payload-based Handshake Algorithm
1: Initialization:
1. Each neighbour, i, sends IDi to S, a prospective Server (Cluster Head).





, λi} ⊲ λi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 2128 − 1}, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
2: for i = 1 : N do ⊲ Nested For loop generates a two-column server table
3: for j = 1 : 2 do
4: input A[i][j] ⊲ IDi and λi are stored in A[i][0] and A[i][1] respectively.
5: end for
6: end for
7: Phase 1 [Session Initiation]: i-> S: {join-request with IDi}
8: ⊲ i sends a join-request message to S containing IDi in the payload.
9: Phase 2 [Server Challenge]: S retrieves IDi to find a matching λi
10: if IDi == A[i][0] then ⊲ A match is found
11: Session negotiation is initiated between i and S
12: S responds with an encrypted payload, {λi, (λi ⊕ µkey|ηserver)}AES128
13: ⊲ where µkey, ηserver ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 2128 − 1}
14: else
15: i is unauthorized and join-request is discarded
16: end if
17: Phase 3 [Client Response & Challenge]: i deciphers challenge and responds with an encrypted
payload, {µkey, (ηserver ⊕ λi|ηclient)}AES128,
18: Phase 4 [Server Response]: S checks ηserver in the client challenge by comparing against the
ηserver generated in phase 3
19: if Both matches then
20: [i becomes a member node of S]- Cluster is formed
21: S responds as {λi, (ηclient|µkey)}AES128
22: else
23: [Session Negotiation Fails]-i is unauthorized and barred from communication in cluster
formation
24: end if
25: i compares ηclient of phase 3 and 4.
26: if Both matches then
27: S becomes member node of S
28: S allocates TDMA slots to i
29: [Data Exchange within a Cluster]:
30: i->S: {di, where di represents data packets of i}.
31: ⊲ i waits for its turn and transmits data encryped with µkey to S.
32: else
33: S is unauthorized
34: end if
Table I. Security Analysis
Security Services LEACH-C SecLEACH PAWN
Authentication No MAC Two-step
Confidentiality No MAC Payload
Freshness No Nonces Nonces
have to authenticate each other. Nonces are non-reproducible and are used only once in the
entire authentication process. The presence of nonces ensure that stale messages are not replayed.
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Table II. Robustness against Network Attacks
Attacks LEACH-C SecLEACH PAWN
Replay No Yes Yes
Resource Exhaustion No No Yes
Sybil No No Yes
are temper-safe in order to avoid compromising the security primitives in accordance with the
Internet Threat Model [24]. This model assumes that λi are hardcoded on the nodes at the time
of manufacturing and deployment. In case, if an intruder attempts to temper with the hardware
of a sensor node, an alarm is generated to notify about the security breach. A malevolent entity
in a cluster head neighbourhood may fabricate its own identities. However, the absence of such
fabricated identities and their matching λi in the server table will not enable this entity to conduct a
Sybil attack. SecLEACH and LEACH-C, on the other hand, do not provide any defensive solution
to tackle resource exhaustion and Sybil attacks.
4.3. Handshake Duration
The average handshake duration of PAWN is compared with SecLEACH in Table III for various
cluster sizes, i.e., the number of potential member nodes in each cluster. The average handshake
duration, in milliseconds, for SecLEACH is much higher than PAWN for various cluster sizes.
Table III. Handshake Duration (in ms)




SecLEACH uses the underlying cluster hierarchy of LEACH protocol, a randomly distributed
approach using a probabilistic threshold for cluster head selection as discussed in Equation
1. In SecLEACH, the absence of local knowledge of the neighbouring nodes requires much
longer time for cluster heads to authenticate its nearest neighbours. PAWN, on the other hand,
uses the local knowledge of its neighbours, i.e., the information provided by the base station
about its neighbourhood, for authentication. Each cluster head only needs to look-up its table to
validate/invalidate a session initiation request. The presence of λi enables each cluster head to enter
into a four phase handshake negotiation for mutual authentication.
4.4. Average Energy Consumption
PAWN algorithm uses somewhat similar centralized approach for cluster formation as LEACH-C
protocol. However, LEACH-C does not provide a secured transmission of data and is susceptible to
a wide range of malicious attacks. In Figure 5, the average energy consumed by PAWN algorithm
is shown in comparison with LEACH-C.
As depicted in Figure 5, the average energy consumed by PAWN is slightly higher (in order
of millijoule) than LEACH-C in most of the rounds. However, the slight increase in energy
consumption is negligible keeping in view that PAWN provides a complete set of operations for
authentication and data protection. LEACH-C, on the other hand, does not provide any secured
features and the election of cluster heads is too complex. LEACH-C elects cluster heads and forms
clusters using the simulated annealing algorithm by solving the N-P hard problem of finding optimal
clusters [13]. This technique of cluster formation and cluster head election incurs excessive delay
and consumes too much energy. On the other hand, PAWN uses a simple technique for cluster
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Figure 5. Average Energy Consumption
head selection which requires a much smaller amount of energy and at the same time provides a
robust defence against various malicious attacks. The novelty and simplicity of cluster head election
technique is the driving force behind energy minimization in PAWN algorithm.
4.5. Average Network Throughput
The average network throughput is calculated as the ratio of total number of packets successfully
received to the total number of packets transmitted to a base station. The average network throughput
of PAWN is shown in Figure 6























Figure 6. Average Network Throughput
The average network throughput of PAWN reaches up to 75% in most of the rounds despite
its operation in hostile, remote locations and communication over error-prone noisy links. These
factors cause too much distortion and attenuation of signals. Although PAWN provides a robust
and defensive solution to the underlying network, the nature of deployed region and quality of
the communication links also play an important role in packet loss and Quality of Service (QoS)
degradation.
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In this paper, we have proposed a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for a cluster-based
hierarchical WSN. The proposed scheme achieves both energy-efficiency and security through
implementing a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for cluster-based WSN. Our proposed
algorithm, Payload-based mutual Authentication for Wireless Sensor NetworkS (PAWN), operates
in two distinct phases and has been presented in detail in this paper. We have compared PAWN
against state-of-the-art LEACH-C and SecLEACH in terms of robustness against attacks, handshake
duration and average energy consumption. Unlike LEACH-C, PAWN is highly robust and resilient to
various attacks such as the replay, DoS and Sybil attacks. SecLEACH, on the other hand, can detect
only a handful of such attacks. The average handshake duration using PAWN is much shorter in
comparison with SecLEACH. Depending on the cluster size, PAWN can establish an authenticated
session with a time almost half of that required by SecLEACH. LEACH-C, on the other hand, lacks
security features and as such does not establish an authenticated session. PAWN is also energy-
efficient as compared with the existing schemes. We have implemented PAWN using AES-128 bit.
We will test the performance of PAWN using other encryption algorithms in our future work. In this
paper, PAWN performs base station/cluster head authentication using tokens. In our future work, we
will perform the same task using alternative techniques to further strengthen the proposed scheme.
In future, we will also investigate the performance of PAWN using a randomly distributed cluster-
based hierarchy, similar to LEACH.
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SUMMARY
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of resource-starving miniature sensor nodes deployed in a
remote and hostile environment. These networks operate on small batteries for days, months and even years
depending on the requirements of monitored applications. The battery-powered operation and inaccessible
human-terrains make it practically infeasible to recharge the nodes unless some energy scavenging
techniques are employed. These networks experience threats at various layers and as such, are vulnerable to
a wide range of attacks. The resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes, in-accessible human terrains and
error-prone communication links make it obligatory to design lightweight but robust and secured schemes
for these networks. In view of these limitations, we aim to design an extremely lightweight payload-based
mutual authentication scheme for a cluster-based hierarchical WSN. The proposed scheme, also known
as PAWN, operates in two steps. First, an optimal percentage of cluster heads is elected, authenticated
and allowed to communicate with neighbouring nodes. Second, each cluster head, in a role of server,
authenticates the nearby nodes for cluster formation. We validate our proposed scheme using various
simulation metrics which outperforms the existing schemes.
Copyright c© 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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KEY WORDS: Cluster Head, Cluster, Authentication, Lightweight, Payload-based, Client-Server Model
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a collection of miniature sensor nodes deployed to monitor,
sense, capture and process the data about an application, i.e., phenomena of interest [1]. These nodes
are resource-starving and as such are highly constrained on battery power, storage, computation,
data rate and available bandwidth. Typically, they are deployed and left unattended in a remote
and human-inaccessible terrain to perform monitoring and reporting tasks. As a result, the limited
resources of these nodes need to be utilized efficiently to prolong the network lifetime. Due to
their unique characteristics of self-healing and fault-tolarance, these networks have found their
applications in various domains such as military surveillance, health care, industrial automation,
home automation, agriculture, and environmental monitoring [2].
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Applications deployed in hostile environment with little human interventions to manage them
expose these networks to various threats and vulnerabilities. These networks are susceptible to
not only physical tampering but also various remote attacks such as sink hole, worm hole, Sybil,
replications, homing and distributed denial-of-service flooding [3][4]. As a result, the nodes in
general and the network in particular need to be protected against these threats. Lightweight but
highly efficient and robust authentication schemes need to be designed for these networks. The
resource-constrained nature of the nodes limits the support and application of resource-intensive,
highly robust and sophisticated authentication and privacy schemes to these networks. The existing
security schemes require ample of resources in terms of computation, transmission, storage and
available bandwidth. Their application to WSNs deteriorates the network performance and rapidly
depletes the network lifetime. As a result, designing lightweight but highly intelligent and robust
security solutions is a challenging task in these networks. The provisioning of security, privacy and
trust need to be kept in mind while the prototype of a routing protocol is designed. Furthermore, the
underlying operations of different routing protocols also influence the energy consumption which
is linked directly with the application of any secured scheme. Among all the routing protocols,
cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols efficiently utilize the limited resources of sensor nodes.
These protocols are highly efficient in terms of data aggregation, energy consumption, collision
avoidance, load balancing, fault-tolerance and network lifetime [5]. Unlike other protocols, a single
cluster head collects data from multiple nodes in order to eliminate redundancy and improves the
quality of aggregated data. These protocols use intra-cluster and inter-cluster communication to
reduce long-haul transmissions to a base station.
Cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols perform only intelligent partitioning of the network
to provide energy-efficient communication. The underlying network still suffers from various threats
posed during set-up and steady-state phases. During set-up phase, an adversary may declare itself
as a cluster head by broadcasting advertisement messages with much stronger signal strengths.
It is also possible that an adversary may participate in cluster formation or prevent legitimate
nodes from joining a cluster head. An attacker may eavesdrop on advertisement packets and/or
join-request packets and replay in other parts of the network. Furthermore, the same attacker has
the ability to maliciously manipulate the contents of these packets. An adversary may disrupt the
ongoing operations in one or more clusters by constantly emitting jamming signals or launching
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [6]. An adversary may deceive a cluster head by persuading it to
create a false member list for its members and as a result, a wrong Time Division Multiple Access
(TDMA) schedule is created for its members [7]. An adversary may launch a more sophisticated
attack by colluding with other adversaries in their neighbourhood [8]. In [9], the authors analyzed
the behaviour of various attacks such as, continuous election as cluster head, TDMA schedule
obedience, aborting and/or no transmission of member/cluster head data and transmission of
powerful signals. In [10], the authors investigated the behaviour of Sybil nodes in cluster-based
hierarchical routing protocols. They studied the impact and consequences of Sybil nodes performing
the role of cluster heads in these networks. A single Sybil node has the ability to breakdown the
whole communication in a cluster-based WSN provided that it is elected as a cluster head.
In this paper, we present a payload-based mutual authentication algorithm, also known as PAWN,
which uses a centralized cluster-based hierarchical WSN. Our proposed algorithm operates in two
steps. In the first step, an optimal percentage of cluster heads are elected to balance the network
load by minimizing the energy consumption of the nodes. For security provisioning, a token-based
authentication approach is adopted. A 16-bit token is used by the base station and the nominated
cluster heads for correlating the advertisement messages with the corresponding acknowledgement
messages. This step ensures that only legitimate cluster heads are elected by a legitimate base
station. In the second step, each elected cluster head negotiates cluster formation with the nearby
neighbouring nodes using four handshake messages which are encrypted with Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES). Data authentication and secured exchange is guaranteed within the payload of each
transmitted message. The major contributions of our research are as follow.
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1. Unlike the existing centralized cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols, our proposed
algorithm always elects an optimal percentage of cluster heads to enhance the lifetime of
the network and reduce the number of server nodes required for communication.
2. Unlike the existing approaches which rely mostly on asymmetric algorithms, PAWN uses
a simple 16-bit token and a lightweight symmetric algorithm, AES in this case, to provide
encryption within the payload of each message. The use of AES in 128-bit mode incurs
extremely small communication and processing overhead and at the same time, the payload
of each message does not exceed 256 bits. For resource-starving sensor nodes, the use of
asymmetric algorithms is a highly resource-intensive operation because most of the resources
of a node are particularly dedicated to these algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the related works from
literature. In Section III, we present our PAWN algorithm in terms of cluster head selection and
cluster formation. In Section IV, experimental results of our proposed scheme are presented. Finally,
the paper is concluded and future research directions are provided in Section V.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide an overview of cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols as they
are used as the underlying platform by our proposed scheme. Next, various lightweight mutual
authentication and key agreement schemes are discussed in the context of WSNs.
Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [11] was designated as a pioneer protocol
among clustering-based hierarchical routing protocols. LEACH partitions a sensor field into small
geographical regions known as clusters. Each cluster has a cluster head node which collects and
aggregates data from member nodes and transmits them to a base station. The protocol operates in
rounds and nodes take turn to become cluster heads in subsequent rounds for uniform distribution of
energy load. The problem with LEACH protocol is the probabilistic selection of cluster heads using
random number generation. Each node, i, chooses a random number between 0 and 1. If the chosen
number is less than the threshold value T(i), the node is elected as a cluster head for the current




, if i ∈ G,
0, otherwise.
(1)
Here, kopt is the optimal percentage of cluster heads in each round, r is the current round and
G is the set of nodes that have not been elected as cluster heads in the past 1kopt rounds. The
probabilistic selection of cluster heads has a potential risk of low energy nodes being elected as
cluster heads in subsequent rounds. Moreover, Equation 1 cannot guarantee an optimal number of
cluster heads in each round. In [12], the authors argued that cluster heads need to be elected based
on the residual energy of the nodes. They suggested the inclusion of residual energy of nodes in
Equation 1. However, it does not solve the problem because cluster heads are still elected using a
random number generation. To solve this problem, nodes need to be elected by a central controller,
i.e., a base station. In [13], the authors proposed a centralized approach for cluster head selection.
Nodes having remaining energy greater than the average residual energy are elected as cluster heads
in each round. However, it is highly probable that there are a large number of such nodes in each
round resulting in too many cluster heads. In [14], we proposed a centralized scheme which elected
an optimal percentage of cluster heads (5% of total nodes). Each round results in balanced clusters
that enhance network stability, scalability and data aggregation. Moreover, the proposed approach
reduces network load, energy consumption and congestion. Irrespective of a centralized or randomly
distributed cluster-based approach, each round consists of a set-up phase and a steady-state phase.
During the set-up phase, cluster heads are elected, cluster are formed and schedules are created. In
the steady-state phase, each cluster head collects data from its member nodes and transmits them to
a centralized base station.
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For secured transmission of data in cluster-based hierarchical networks, there exist various
secured versions of LEACH in literature [15] [16][17][18][21][22][27][28]. Most of these protocols
used a one-way key chain[19] for encryption and decryption purposes. The chain is generated
using a one-way hash function H on the last key in each chain. In [20], a survey was conducted
to analyze and evaluate the performances of various secured cluster-based hierarchical schemes.
Most of these schemes increase the security of set-up and steady-state phases in particular and the
overall operation of the network in general. In these schemes, LEACH-alike cluster hierarchies are
protected against various attacks launched by adversaries from outside the network. These schemes
make it hard to compromise various operations performed within the set-up and steady-state phases
by deploying various key distribution mechanisms. The application of asymmetric encryption to
miniature sensor nodes exhausts their resources quickly and rapidly reduce the lifetime of WSNs.
As a result, most of the studies focus on symmetric encryption for security and privacy provisioning
in cluster-based WSNs. In [23], SecLEACH protocol was proposed for securing cluster-based
hierarchical WSNs. Prior to network deployment, SecLEACH generates a large pool of keys using
a random key pre-distribution approach. Each node is allocated a small subset of these keys, also
known as key ring, drawn pseudo randomly from the pool. Furthermore, each node is assigned a
pairwise key which is shared with the base station and a group key common to each member of the
network. Upon network deployment, each cluster head advertises itself by broadcasting a message
containing information about the keys in its pre-defined key ring. In SecLEACH, the base station is
responsible for authenticating the advertisement messages as it is a resource-rich entity and is highly
trusted. Upon authentication by the base station, each neighbouring node forms a cluster around its
nearest cluster head with whom they share the group key. Cryptographic-based LEACH variants
are robust only against external attacks, however, they are not capable to tackle threats posed by
internal adversaries, e.g., a compromised sensor. This is due to the fact that compromised sensors
have already been allocated authentication keys and they have the same privileges which are required
for transmission of authenticated information. As a result, conventional authentication algorithms
fail to detect such an attack [24]. A centralized secure LEACH (CSLEACH) was proposed in [25].
Each neighbouring node and its gateway share a unique private key which is used for authentication
of broadcasted advertisement messages. Each node possesses two keys, i.e., a gateway private key
and a neighbor private key. A node waits for a message upon entering the network at the start of each
round. A particular round is initiated by the gateway using a Round Start Message (RSM). These
messages are mainly used for synchronization purposes. These messages distribute a network key
and a session template for generation of Medium Access Control keys (KMAC) and session keys.
Any communication between a neighbouring node and its gateway is encrypted by the session key.
These keys also encrypt the communication between a cluster head and its member nodes. KMAC,
on the other hand, encodes MAC for providing integrity in the network.
3. PAWN: PAYLOAD-BASED AUTHENTICATION FOR WSN
Our proposed scheme mainly consists of two important steps and are presented as follows.
1. An optimal percentage of cluster heads are elected and advertised to the network using
a token-based authentication approach. The token is used for correlating cluster head
advertisement messages with the corresponding acknowledgment messages.
2. A payload-based mutual authentication is used for cluster formation between neighbouring
nodes and their nearest cluster head.
Both of these steps are part of the set-up phase during which cluster heads are elected and clusters
are formed around them. In this section, first we present the token-based optimal election of cluster
heads followed by a payload-based mutual authentication for a cluster-based hierarchical WSN. An
optimal election of cluster heads enables us to nominate very few nodes as servers. The unelected
nodes become the potential clients of cluster heads in the network.
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3.1. Token-based Cluster Head Election
Our proposed network model consists of randomly deployed heterogeneous sensor nodes. There are
100 normal nodes and 5 higher-energy nodes in the network. To reduce the operational cost, normal
nodes are equipped with initial energy of 1 joule each, and higher-energy nodes are equipped with 5
joules each. All nodes are deployed in a 100× 100 sq. meter geographical region. The role of each
node is specified as follows.
1. Only normal nodes can be elected as cluster heads.
2. Only normal nodes are eligible to participate in a client-server interaction model.
3. Higher-energy nodes assist the base station in cluster head election.
4. Higher-energy nodes exchange control packets with the base station while normal nodes
transmit both data and control packets.
Upon network deployment, each normal node is assigned a token and a pre-shared secret (λi).
Token is used for secure exchange of nomination packets and ACKs between a base station and a
cluster head while λi is used for in-network mutual authentication between a neighbouring node
and its prospective cluster head. Higher-energy nodes perform various administrative tasks such as
route discovery, route maintenance and neighbourhood discovery. Each higher-energy node collects
and disseminates control packets during upstream and downstream traffic.
Initially, each normal node, i, creates and broadcasts a control packet to its nearest higher-energy
node as shown in Figure 1. This packet contains the residual energy (Ei) and identity (IDi) of i. The
location of a nearest higher-energy node with respect to i is computed by solving Euclidean distance
(dH) of Equation 2.
dH =
√






















Figure 1. Network at the Time of Deployment
Each higher-energy node collects these packets in their neighbourhood, retrieves Ei and IDi, and
broadcasts a single control packet containing these values to a base station. After transmission of
the packet to a base station, the higher-energy nodes go to sleep mode and will awake at the start of
next round to initiate the aforementioned tasks. Upon reception, the base station retrieves Ei and IDi







Here, Eavg is the average energy threshold for a total of N normal nodes, where N is equal to 100.
Any normal node i having Ei greater than or equal to Eavg in a particular round is eligible for
cluster head selection, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. The only exception is the initial round immediately
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after network deployment, where all the nodes have nearly the same residual energy values, i.e., Ei
≈ Eavg. All such nodes are eligible for cluster head selection because ∆Ea,b ≈ 0, where ∆Ea,b =
Ea - Eb, ∀ a, b ∈ {1, 2, , · · · , N}. In our proposed scheme, base station has the ability to elect cluster
heads based on extremely low values of ∆E, up to 4 decimal digits.
In cluster-based hierarchical routing protocols, it is highly probable that there may be a large
number of nodes for whom Ei ≥ Eavg in various rounds. All such nodes are candidates, also known
as nominees, for cluster heads. The only exception is towards the end of network lifetime where
nominees are either equal to or less than kopt. The base station is responsible to elect kopt cluster
heads among the nominees. We use the following criteria for an optimal election.
• Ei of a nominee, i, is greater than or equal to Eavg.
• i is not elected as cluster head during the past 1p rounds.• Two or more nominees located in a same geographical region are evaluated based on their
energy values and previous history of election.
In our proposed scheme, kopt is 5% for a network of N nodes. An optimal percentage of cluster
heads influences the performance of cluster-based hierarchical networks. Energy of a cluster head
is depleted rapidly due to resource-intensive tasks such as data aggregation, fusion and long-haul
transmission to a base station. A small value of kopt will deteriorate the performance of cluster-based
hierarchical network because each cluster head will accommodate a large set of neighbouring nodes
in its cluster. In this case, energy of each cluster head will be exhausted rapidly in the aforementioned
resource-intensive operations. A large value of kopt will make a cluster-based hierarchical network
rather inefficient and ineffective due to low data aggregation and fusion [10].
In each round, the base station broadcasts nomination packets to the elected cluster heads
containing their identities (forming the set IDCH) and identities (forming the set IDNB) of their
neighbouring nodes. Both these types of identities are transmitted within the payload of nomination
packets. Recall that the base station knows the identity of each node and its geographical location.
To ensure secured transmission of IDCH and IDNB, each nomination packet has a 16-bit token in its
header. The base station generates a token similar to the one possessed by an elected cluster head,
i.e., one token per cluster head is generated. The number of tokens generated depends on the number
of elected cluster heads. Upon reception, each cluster head, denoted by S, examines the appended
token within the nomination packet. If it matches with the one possessed by it, the cluster head
retrieves the appended identities (IDNB) of its neighbouring nodes, where IDNB ⊂ IDNB. Each cluster
head must acknowledge the receipt of a nomination packet. It creates an acknowledgment message
(ACK), appends its token to the ACK and transmits the ACK to the base station. An adversary
may intercept one or more nomination packets, however, it cannot reproduce the token required to
retrieve IDNB. An adversary would require 2
16 attempts to retrieves IDNB from a nomination packet.
Upon election and successful exchange of nomination packet/ACK, each cluster head advertises
itself to the nearest neighbours. A neighbouring node may receive advertisement messages from
multiple cluster heads, however, it associates itself with the one having the strongest signal strength
among all. The neighbouring nodes in overlapping regions receive signals from multiple cluster
heads as shown in Figure 2(a). In this figure, the circles and ovals do not represent clusters. Instead,
they represent the regions where the signal strength of each cluster head, identified with black colour
nodes, is detected. The signal strength experienced by a node is represented by an arrow, where a
solid arrow represents a strong signal, dashed arrow represents a medium signal and dotted arrow
represents a weak signal. Each neighbouring node pursues its connection with a cluster head having
the strongest signal as shown in Figure 2(b). In this figure, the oval, circle and rectangle indicate the
intention of each node for joining a prospective cluster head. Cluster formation is yet to take place
at this point of time.
Each neighbour node sends a join-request message to a cluster head having the strongest of
signal strength for cluster formation. However, cluster formation is not a straight forward process.
A neighbour needs to authenticate itself before association with a cluster head. Furthermore, each
neighbour is not sure about the authenticity of a cluster head. As a result, not only the neighbours,
but also the cluster head needs to authenticate themselves. To do so, each neighbour transmits a
join-request message to a prospective cluster head as discussed in the next section.
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Figure 2. Initiating Cluster Formation
3.2. Payload-based Mutual Authentication
Upon successful reception of advertisement messages, each neighbouring node initiates cluster
formation. The aim of cluster head selection was to elect a feasible number of servers for
neighbouring nodes. On the other hand, the aim of cluster formation is to allow authentic data
transmission to a base station via the elected servers. The authentication process is accomplished
using a 128-bit AES encryption algorithm. This mode of encryption requires less resources and is
extremely beneficial for time-critical, delay-sensitive data generated by the nodes. Furthermore,
it allows enough time for the nodes to offload their data before an attack is launched. AES-
192 and AES-256, on the other hand, are highly computational, resource-consuming and require
sophisticated hardware and software platforms. Such requirements are not fulfilled by most of the
resource-constrained sensor nodes.
To meet the requirements of resource-starving miniature sensor nodes, we use a lightweight
payload-based mutual authentication technique. In our proposed scheme, authentication is
performed within the payload of each message. Each neighbouring node exchanges multiple
handshake messages with a server as shown in Figure 3. The authentication process is completed
in four extremely light-weighted handshake messages. Once authenticated, each neighbouring
node is allowed to transmit its data to its respective cluster head. The authentication procedure
is accomplished using the following four simple phases.
1. Session Initiation
2. Server Challenge
3. Client Response and Challenge
4. Server Response
During session initiation, each neighbour, i, creates a join-request message which contains IDi
and IDCHS . Here, IDi is the identity of the source node and IDCHS is the identity of the destination
node of cluster head, S. Both the source and destination IDs are of 8-bits. This number of bits results
in sufficiently light-weighted join-request messages. Irrespective of a legitimate or a malicious node,
each neighbour can negotiate a maximum of four session initiation requests with a server. After these
attempts, any further requests from the given neighbour are discarded and the server refrains from
any further communication with it. During session initiation phase, IDi is transmitted within the
payload and IDCHS is transmitted within the header of each join-request message. The payload is
followed by an optional Frame Check Sequence (FCS), which is appended as a trailer and is used
for error detection and correction.
In the server challenge phase, each server retrieves IDCHS from the header and IDi from the
payload of a received join-request message. If IDCHS matches the server ID, it means that the join-
request message was indeed intended for it. If a match is not found, the join-request message is
discarded. To negotiate a session, IDi must match with an identity within the pool of identities
provided to a given server. A match can only be found if IDi ∈ IDNB. Each server retrieves IDi from
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Figure 3. Payload-based Mutual Authentication
the payload and searches for a matching λi. Each identity IDi within IDNB is associated with a λi
for authentication purpose. If a match is found, the server responds back with an encrypted payload
using an AES algorithm. At this point, the server creates a challenge for the client i. For successful
authentication, this challenge needs to be deciphered by i.
To create a challenge, the server generates a pseudo-random nonce (ηserver) and a potential
session key (µkey) of 128-bit each. Nonce is a temporary number used only once by a client/server
in the entire cryptographic communication. Using µkey and ηserver, an encrypted payload is
generated. First, an XOR operation is performed on λi and µkey using Equation 4. This operation
is computationally inexpensive and is extremely common as a component in complex ciphers.
Moreover, this operation does not leak information about the original plaintext and applying it twice
enables the retrieval of original plaintext. In our case, plaintext is the session key.
ψresultant = λi ⊕ µkey. (4)
The 128-bit ψresultant is appended to ηserver and encrypted with λi to generate a payload of
256-bit using Equation 5. This payload, i.e., γserver-payload, is transmitted to the client as a challenge.
γserver-payload = {λi, (ψresultant|ηserver)}AES128. (5)
In the client response and challenge phase, the client needs to decipher the encrypted payload
(γserver-payload) to retrieve the potential session key µkey. If the client is successful to do so, it will
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have the correct ηserver and µkey. The ηserver and µkey are known only to the server and λi belongs
to a specific client. Only a legitimate client can decipher this challenge. An intruder can eavesdrop
only on ηserver and µkey, but not on λi in accordance with the Internet Threat model [26]. The client
uses its λi to decipher the payload. Upon successful deciphering, the client has authenticated itself.
As mutual authentication requires both parties to be verified, the server also needs to authenticate
itself. The client generates a new encrypted payload similar to the server. First, an XOR is performed
on ηserver and λi using Equation 6.
ψresultant = ηserver ⊕ λi. (6)
The 128-bit ψresultant is appended with ηclient and encrypted with µkey to generate an encrypted
payload as shown in Equation 7. The 256-bit encrypted payload (γclient-payload) is transmitted to the
server as a challenge.
γclient-payload = {µkey, (ψresultant|ηclient)}AES128. (7)
Finally, in the server response phase, the server deciphers the encrypted payload (γclient-payload)
of the client challenge to observe ηserver in it. If present, the server realizes that the client has
successfully authenticated itself. The server retrieves ηclient and creates an encrypted payload of its
own by appending ηclient to µkey and encrypting with λi as shown in Equation 8. Next, the 256-bit
encrypted payload (γserver-payload) is transmitted in response to the client challenge.
γserver-payload = {λi, (ηclient|µkey)}AES128. (8)
At this point of time, the status of ongoing session changes from session negotiation to
authenticated at the server because client i is successfully authenticated and is eligible to transmit
its data to the server. The client, however, has yet to verify the authenticity of the server. It decrypts
the payload γserver-payload and observe ηclient in it. As the client is the one which generated ηclient,
the client comprehends that the response is from a legitimate server. Both the client and the server
are mutually authenticated and they have agreed upon a common session key (µkey) for exchanging
the data packets. At this stage, both i and the server are mutually authenticated. The server creates a
schedule for each member node iwithin its cluster. The server allocates TDMA slots to each member
node within its cluster. These slots are used for contention-free communication and scheduling the
duty-cycle of each node. The four phases of our payload-based mutual authentication handshaking
are shown in Algorithm 1.
Once the client and server are authenticated, the set-up phase is completed and the steady-
state phase is initiated. During this phase, each cluster head collects data from its member nodes,
aggregates the data and transmits them to a base station located inside or outside the sensor field. In
Figure 4, the complete set of operations performed by PAWN is shown.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results and experimental analysis of PAWN algorithm. For
simulation, we set up our experiments using Matlab R2011a. PAWN network model consists of
100 normal nodes and 5 higher-energy nodes deployed in a 100× 100 square meter area. The base
station is located outside the sensor field and is a resource-rich entity.
4.1. Security Analysis
PAWN provides authenticity, confidentiality and freshness of data for node-to-node communication.
In Table I, we compare PAWN against the existing schemes.
PAWN uses a two-step procedure for provisioning of authentication. First, a predefined procedure
is used to elect the cluster heads. Upon election, a token-based technique is used for secured
transmission of advertisement messages. Second, each cluster head, in a role of server, verifies
the identities of potential clients, i.e., the neighbouring nodes. The payload-based authentication is
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Algorithm 1 Payload-based Handshake Algorithm
1: Initialization:
1. Each neighbour, i, sends IDi to S, a prospective Server (Cluster Head).
2. S is provided with IDNB and λi
3. Input: {IDNB, λi} . λi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 2128 − 1}, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
2: for i = 1 : N do . Nested For loop generates a two-column server table
3: for j = 1 : 2 do
4: input A[i][j] . IDi and λi are stored in A[i][0] and A[i][1] respectively.
5: end for
6: end for
7: Phase 1 [Session Initiation]: i-> S: {join-request with IDi}
8: . i sends a join-request message to S containing IDi in the payload.
9: Phase 2 [Server Challenge]: S retrieves IDi to find a matching λi
10: if IDi == A[i][0] then . A match is found
11: Session negotiation is initiated between i and S
12: S responds with an encrypted payload, {λi, (λi ⊕ µkey|ηserver)}AES128
13: . where µkey, ηserver ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 2128 − 1}
14: else
15: i is unauthorized and join-request is discarded
16: end if
17: Phase 3 [Client Response & Challenge]: i deciphers challenge and responds with an encrypted
payload, {µkey, (ηserver ⊕ λi|ηclient)}AES128,
18: Phase 4 [Server Response]: S checks ηserver in the client challenge by comparing against the
ηserver generated in phase 3
19: if Both matches then
20: [i becomes a member node of S]- Cluster is formed
21: S responds as {λi, (ηclient|µkey)}AES128
22: else
23: [Session Negotiation Fails]-i is unauthorized and barred from communication in cluster
formation
24: end if
25: i compares ηclient of phase 3 and 4.
26: if Both matches then
27: S becomes member node of S
28: S allocates TDMA slots to i
29: [Data Exchange within a Cluster]:
30: i->S: {di, where di represents data packets of i}.
31: . i waits for its turn and transmits data encryped with µkey to S.
32: else
33: S is unauthorized
34: end if
used to validate the identities of nodes in the incoming packets. In comparison, LEACH-C does
not provide any authentication as it only partitions the network into clusters. SecLEACH, on the
other hand, uses Message Authentication Code (MAC) for authentication purpose. Each message
is encrypted with a key using a key pool. After successful decryption of the message, the receiver
knows that message is originated from a legitimate node in the sensor field.
PAWN uses a payload-based approach to provide message confidentiality. The payload of join-
request messages and nomination packets are used for this purpose. LEACH-C, on the other
hand, does not provide data confidentiality while SecLEACH uses the same MAC for message
confidentiality. Freshness of messages is guaranteed by nonces in PAWN and SecLEACH. PAWN,
as a mutual authentication scheme, includes both the client and server nonces because both parties
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Figure 4. Flowchart of PAWN Protocol
Table I. Security Analysis
Security Services LEACH-C SecLEACH PAWN
Authentication No MAC Two-step
Confidentiality No MAC Payload
Freshness No Nonces Nonces
have to authenticate each other. Nonces are non-reproducible and are used only once in the
entire authentication process. The presence of nonces ensure that stale messages are not replayed.
The freshness of all subsequent readings from sensor is guaranteed by nonces values which are
incremented each time.
4.2. Robustness against various Attacks
The robustness of PAWN algorithm against various attacks and malicious activities is shown in Table
II. In PAWN, ηclient and ηserver are generated by a pseudo-random number (Ri) and appended to
a timer Ti. The combination of Ti and Ri assure that an adversary will find it extremely difficult to
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replay stale packets. The pseudo-random nature of Ti guarantees that ηserver and ηclient are non-
reproducible while the timer Ti ensures that ηserver and ηclient are non-predictable. SecLEACH uses
hash function (H) and ring keys (kr) for protection against replay attacks. LEACH-C, a pioneer
protocol for cluster-based hierarchical architectures, does not provide any protection against any
attack.
Table II. Robustness against Network Attacks
Attacks LEACH-C SecLEACH PAWN
Replay No Yes Yes
Resource Exhaustion No No Yes
Sybil No No Yes
Apart from replay attack, PAWN is highly robust and defensive against resource exhaustion and
DoS attacks. The proposed scheme uses λi for authenticating the session initiation request from
any neighbouring node, also known as potential member node. The absence of λi in the server
table ensures that any unauthenticated neighbouring node will not be able to establish one or more
connection with a given server. As a result, the resources of a server remain intact. The nodes
are temper-safe in order to avoid compromising the security primitives in accordance with the
Internet Threat Model [26]. This model assumes that λi are hardcoded on the nodes at the time
of manufacturing and deployment. In case, if an intruder attempts to temper with the hardware
of a sensor node, an alarm is generated to notify about the security breach. A malevolent entity
in a cluster head neighbourhood may fabricate its own identities. However, the absence of such
fabricated identities and their matching λi in the server table will not enable this entity to conduct a
Sybil attack. SecLEACH and LEACH-C, on the other hand, do not provide any defensive solution
to tackle resource exhaustion and Sybil attacks.
4.3. Handshake Duration
The average handshake duration of PAWN is compared with SecLEACH in Table III for various
cluster sizes, i.e., the number of potential member nodes in each cluster. The average handshake
duration, in milliseconds, for SecLEACH is much higher than PAWN for various cluster sizes.
Table III. Handshake Duration (in ms)




SecLEACH uses the underlying cluster hierarchy of LEACH protocol, a randomly distributed
approach using a probabilistic threshold for cluster head selection as discussed in Equation
1. In SecLEACH, the absence of local knowledge of the neighbouring nodes requires much
longer time for cluster heads to authenticate its nearest neighbours. PAWN, on the other hand,
uses the local knowledge of its neighbours, i.e., the information provided by the base station
about its neighbourhood, for authentication. Each cluster head only needs to look-up its table to
validate/invalidate a session initiation request. The presence of λi enables each cluster head to enter
into a four phase handshake negotiation for mutual authentication.
4.4. Average Energy Consumption
PAWN algorithm uses somewhat similar centralized approach for cluster formation as LEACH-C
protocol. However, LEACH-C does not provide a secured transmission of data and is susceptible to
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a wide range of malicious attacks. In Figure 5, the average energy consumed by PAWN algorithm
is shown in comparison with LEACH-C.





























Figure 5. Average Energy Consumption
As depicted in Figure 5, the average energy consumed by PAWN is slightly higher (in order
of millijoule) than LEACH-C in most of the rounds. However, the slight increase in energy
consumption is negligible keeping in view that PAWN provides a complete set of operations for
authentication and data protection. LEACH-C, on the other hand, does not provide any secured
features and the election of cluster heads is too complex. LEACH-C elects cluster heads and forms
clusters using the simulated annealing algorithm by solving the N-P hard problem of finding optimal
clusters [13]. This technique of cluster formation and cluster head election incurs excessive delay
and consumes too much energy. On the other hand, PAWN uses a simple technique for cluster
head selection which requires a much smaller amount of energy and at the same time provides a
robust defence against various malicious attacks. The novelty and simplicity of cluster head election
technique is the driving force behind energy minimization in PAWN algorithm.
4.5. Average Network Throughput
The average network throughput is calculated as the ratio of total number of packets successfully
received at the base station to the total number of transmitted packets. The average network
throughput of PAWN is shown in Figure 6. In absence of an authentication scheme, the number of
packets transmitted to a base station is much higher because each scheme incurs higher processing
overhead and has a much higher buffer occupancy. These two factors result in packet processing
delay, packet loss, queuing delay and increase the number of retransmission attempts. PAWN
provides authentication not only at the cluster head election time but also during cluster formation.
Even with the provisioning of authentication at two levels, the percentage of packets successfully
received at the base station is much higher in most of the rounds. The average network throughput
of PAWN reaches up to 75% in most of the rounds despite its operation in hostile, remote locations
and communication over error-prone noisy links. These factors cause too much distortion and
attenuation of signals. Although PAWN provides a robust and defensive solution to the underlying
network, the nature of deployed region and quality of the communication links also play an
important role in packet loss and Quality of Service (QoS) degradation.
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Figure 6. Average Network Throughput
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for a cluster-based
hierarchical WSN. The proposed scheme utilizes the energy-efficient nature of cluster-based
hierarchical architecture for energy minimization and the lightweight features of the mutual
authentication scheme for security provisioning. Our proposed algorithm, Payload-based mutual
Authentication for Wireless Sensor NetworkS (PAWN), operates in two phases. First, an optimal
percentage of cluster heads are elected and advertised by the base station, and broadcast nomination
packets are used to ensure that only legitimate cluster heads receive those advertisements. Second,
each cluster head uses a simple four phase mutual handshaking to authenticate any neighbouring
node wishing to be a member node. If handshaking is successful, each cluster head forms a cluster
and the authenticated neighbouring node becomes a member node of it. Next, each cluster head
collects data from its member nodes and transmits to a centralized base station. We have compared
PAWN against state-of-the-art LEACH-C and SecLEACH in terms of various performance metrics
such as robustness against attacks, handshake duration and average energy consumption. Unlike
LEACH-C, PAWN is highly robust and resilient to various attacks such as replay, DoS, Sybil and
resource exhaustion. SecLEACH, on the other hand, can detect only a handful of such attacks.
The average handshake duration of PAWN is much shorter as compared to SecLEACH. Depending
on the cluster size, PAWN can establish an authenticated session in a time almost half of that
required by SecLEACH. LEACH-C, on the other hand, lacks security features and as such does
not establish an authenticated session. PAWN is also energy-efficient as compared to the existing
schemes because it consumes much smaller energy despite provisioning of robust security features.
We have implemented PAWN using AES-128 bit, however, it would be interesting to see its
performance using other encryption algorithms. Moreover, apart from symmetric encryption, PAWN
is open to public key encryption techniques provided that energy-efficient nature of the scheme
and the resource-constrained nature of the nodes remain intact. Presently, PAWN performs base
station/cluster head authentication using tokens, however, the same task can be achieved using some
other alternative techniques to further minimize the energy consumption. PAWN uses the centralized
cluster-based hierarchical architecture for cluster head election. In future, we are interested to see
the performance of PAWN for a randomly distributed cluster-based hierarchy, similar to LEACH.
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